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Abstract
Following a paper in which the fundamental aspects of probabilistic inference were
introduced by means of a toy experiment, details of the analysis of simulated long se-
quences of extractions are shown here. In fact, the striking performance of probability-
based inference and forecasting, compared to those obtained by simple ‘rules’, might
impress those practitioners who are usually underwhelmed by the philosophical foun-
dation of the different methods. The analysis of the sequences also shows how the
smallness of the probability of what has actually been observed, given the hypotheses
of interest, is irrelevant for the purpose of inference.
“Grown-ups like numbers”
(Saint-Exupe´ry’s Little Prince)
1 Introduction
For years I have been using a toy experiment for introducing probabilistic reasoning. Ir-
respective of whether my audience has been of professional physicists and engineers,1 high
school students, teachers and general public,2 or even managers and senior officers attend-
ing a decision-making school,3 this toy model has always been an “eye opener”. This is
how it was defined by the editors of a special issue of the American Journal of Physics,4 in
which this ‘experiment’ was first published [1].
A thorough description of the game, and what can be learned from it, is given in Ref.
[2]. In particular, in that paper I explain the reasons why I do not let anyone see the balls
in the box. At most we can make simulated extractions, in which we can ‘almost’ see the
∗Addendum to arXiv:1612.05292.
1See e.g. http://indico.cern.ch/event/419045/ and http://www.roma1.infn.it/~dagos/prob+
stat.html#cern05; http://2015.imtc.ieee-ims.org/content/tutorials and http://www.roma1.infn.
it/~dagos/prob+stat.html#IEEEPisa.
2See e.g. http://www.lnf.infn.it/edu/openlabs/2016/conference.php and http://orientamento.
matfis.uniroma3.it/fisincittastorico.php#dagostini (in Italian).
3See e.g. http://www.pangeaformazione.it/en/training/decision-making-school.html.
4http://stp.clarku.edu/ajp_contributors.html.
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Figure 1: A sketch of the six boxes of the toy experiment. The index refers to the number of white
balls.
game from the God’s perspective: we know the box composition with certainty, and give
a superior smile at the algorithm that is trying to guess it. ‘Almost’, because we remain
uncertain about the color of future extractions.
Let us see then what we can learn from simulations. Firstly, in order to allow readers
to reproduce the results, details of the simulation are given in Section 2. For this reason, as
examples of how to generate and analyze the sequences, R commands are given. In Sections
3-5, some sequences are analyzed in detail. Whenever possible, the numbers obtained from
the probability theory algorithm are compared with those resulting from ‘simple rules’. But,
as made clear in Section 6, this is not always possible. Finally, in Section 7, I emphasize
the fact that most real life cases – as random sequences of black and white balls extracted
from a box are – might have ‘astronomically’ small probabilities of occurrence, given the
hypotheses of interest. But, nevertheless, the smallness of each conditional probability is
irrelevant for the inference. Instead, what matters are their ratios and the relative prior
beliefs of the different hypotheses.
2 Simulated sequences
Thousand extractions from each of the boxes B0, B1 and B2 (Fig. 1), since we can form
an idea of what happens from the others just by (anti-)symmetry. The R code to generate
and analyze the sequences is based on that shown in Footnote 31 of [2], but we report here
also the inferential story as the extractions go on. Moreover, for the benefit of the reader,
who can then check the details of the results the ‘seed’ of the random generator is given,
equal to 20160715, for the date of the talk upon which this paper is based (no special, fancy
sequences have been cherry-picked).
Here are the four lines of R code to make initializations and extractions (‘0’ for Black
and ‘1’ for White):5
N = 5; i = 0:N; pii = i/N; n = 1000; set.seed(20160715)
seq.B0 = rbinom(n, 1, pii[1])
seq.B1 = rbinom(n, 1, pii[2])
seq.B2 = rbinom(n, 1, pii[3])
5The csv files of the sequences analyzed here can be downloaded from http://www.
roma1.infn.it/~dagos/prob+stat.html#addendum_ME, and then loaded in a R session by e.g.
seq.B0 = as.vector( read.csv("seq_B0.txt")$x ).
2
Later, in order to have a feeling of the performances of the method,6 we can split the
sequences in ‘runs’ of 100 extractions and analyze them independently.
3 Box B0
The runs from B0 will obviously be all equal, since that composition can only produce 0’s
(Black), and therefore only the first run is shown (Fig. 2). We see (upper plot) that as
we continue to observe Black our confidence that we have ‘picked’ B0 steady increases. B5
is obviously ruled out from the very beginning, while the probability we have to assign
the compositions having both colors decreases exponentially with the increasing number of
extractions (note the log scale in the ordinates).7 After 100 extractions the probability of
B0 differ from unity by about 10
−10, essentially the probability of B1, while all others are
less probable by tens of orders of magnitude.8 So, we are practically certain about B0 – but
those who only like certainty have to remember that our only certainty is that B5 is ruled
out.
The lower plot of Fig. 2 shows, instead, the probability of White in a next extraction,
that is P (W | seq) (blue circles). Its exponential decrease results from the exponential
decrease of P (Bi |nB, I), for i > 0.9 Thus after 100 Black in a row we become ‘practically
certain’ to observe Black in the 101-th extraction, being the probability of White only
4 × 10−11 – but yet not impossible! 10 (If you think that very improbable events do not
occur in real life, then wait for Appendix B.)
For comparison we could show in the same plot also the relative frequency of White
in the n extractions, as we shall do with the simulations from the other boxes, but, since
in this case it is always zero, it is of little interest, and anyway not representable in a log
6I you wish and it helps you, you might think of the ‘propensity’ [2] of the algorithm to produce some
numbers rather then others.
7The reason is quite simple, with the approximation being valid for ‘large’ values of n (and for i 6= 5):
P (Bi |nB, I) = P (nB |Bi, I)× 1/6
1× 1/6 + (4/5)n × 1/6 + · · · =
(5− i)/5× 1/6
1× 1/6 + (4/5)n × 1/6 + · · ·
≈
(
5− i
5
)n
=
(
5
5− i
)−n
.
,
8More precisely, executing the R command of Footnote 31 of Ref. [2] with ri=0 we get
[1] 1.000000e+00 2.037036e-10 6.533186e-23 1.606938e-40 1.267651e-70
9In fact, using the result of Footnote 7,
P (W |nB, I) = P (W |B1, I) · P (B1 |nB, I) + · · ·
≈ 1
5
×
(
5
4
)−n
.
With n = 100 we obtain 4× 10−11, or 1 in 25 billions (remember that ‘who’ analyses the sequence does not
know the real content of the box.)
10You can evaluate this probability also using the of R code in Footnote 31 of Ref. [2] remember to change
the first sprintf() format, for example with %.15f or %.5e. The results are ‘numerically’ the same.
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Figure 2: Simulated extractions from B0 (see text, especially for the meaning of ”Laplace”, that indeed
stands for ”misused Laplace rule of succession”).
4
scale. It is, instead, more interesting, the probability evaluated (incorrectly!) applying the
Laplace rule of succession (Equation 15 of Ref. [2]), that in this case becomes 1/(n + 2),
and, by complement (n + 1)/(n + 2) for Black. As we can see, the performance is rather
poor.
However is not Laplace to be wrong11, but rather those who would use his formula a-
critically, without understanding the assumptions behind it, which were discussed in detail
in the text. In our specific case, as it might be in important cases of real life, the prior of
the propensity of the box to give White was not uniform between between 0 and 1. We
had instead only six possible values, and the full calculation takes into account of the real
situation.12 For this reason the name of Laplace is in quote marks in the legends of the
figures, to mean “misused Laplace rule.”
4 Box B1
The analysis of the sequences from box B1 (and, by symmetry, from B4) is in general
the most interesting and instructive, because the probabilities calculated using probability
theory, taking into account all the available information properly, differ quite a lot from
those obtained using intuitive heuristics, or from ‘prescriptions’ based on improper use of
theoretical results not fully understood (see Footnote 11). Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the
results of the inferences and of the (probabilistic) predictions based on three sequential
runs of 100 extractions each. Each story is peculiar, as real life situations are, and we see
that – in the simulations we know the ‘truth’ – the method based on probability theory,
and which take into account at best all available information, performs much better than
the others.
It is worth remembering that all real cases are unique and we can only rely on the
11This is, for example, verbatim what he wrote concerning his too much misunderstood probability of the
sun rising tomorrow: “On trouve ainsi qu’un e´ve´nement e´tant arriv‘’e de suite, un nombre quelconque de
fois; la probabilite´ qu’il arrivera encore la fois suivente, est e´gale a` ce nombre augmente´ de l’unite´, divise´
par le meˆme nombre augmente´ de deux unite´s. [(n+ 1)/(n+ 2)] En faisant, par example, remonter la plues
ancienne e´poque de l’histoire, a` cinq mill ans, ou a` 1826213 jours, et le solei s’e´tant leve´ constenmment dans
cet intervall, a` chaque re´volution de vinght-quatre heures; il y a 1826214 a` parier contre un, qu’il se levera
encore demain. Mais ce nombre est incomparablement plus fort pour celui qui connaissant par l’ensemble
des phe´nome`nes, le principe re´gulateur des jours et des saisons, voit que rien dans le moment actuel, ne
peut en arreˆter le cours.” [“Thus we find that an event having occurred successively any number of times,
the probability that it will happen again the next time is equal to this number increased by unity divided by
the same number, increased by two units. Placing the most ancient epoch of history at five thousand years
ago, or at 182623 days, and the sun having risen constantly in the interval of each revolution of twenty-four
hours, it is a bet of 1826214 to one that it will rise again tomorrow. But this number is incomparably greater
for him who, recognizing in the totality of phenomena the principal regulator of days and seasons, sees that
nothing at the present moment can arrest the course of it.”] (italics and underline mine) [3]. Great Laplace!
(And please note once more the probability expressed in terms of a virtual coherent bet.)
12I have called the attention several times in the past (e.g. [4]) that prior-less methods are not by default
‘objective’ because “they do not use priors.” On the contrary, it is possible to show that there are in most
cases hidden (most times) uniform priors, like in the result of the so called maximum-likelihood method of
the statisticians (see e.g. [4]).
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Figure 3: Simulated extractions from B1 (run 1: 1:100).
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Figure 4: Simulated extractions from B1 (run 2: 101:200).
7
1111111111111111
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
0 20 40 60 80 100
1e
−3
1
1e
−2
4
1e
−1
7
1e
−1
0
1e
−0
3
e
P(
Bi 
| s
eq
)
00000000000000002222222222222222
2222222222222
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
3333333333333333
333333333333
33
333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
3333333333333333333
4444444444444444
444444444444
44
444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444444444
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lllllllll
lllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
e
P(
W
 | s
eq
)  [
or 
 'ru
le
s'] l BayesFrequency
"Laplace"
Figure 5: Simulated extractions from B1 (run 3: 201:300).
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quality of the methods, as well as of the data and all relevant information. As someone
says (reference missing), in the Bayesian analysis “the result is the result.” For example,
in the first part of sequence on which of Fig. 3 is based, B1 and B2 seemed practically
equally likely, and, as consequence, the probability of White in the next extraction was in
between 1/5 and 2/5. That’s all. This the best we could say at that moment, but as soon
as the overall relative frequencies of White approaches 20% (frequencies are reported as
black triangles in the lower plot) there as a kind of ‘attraction’ from B1: its probability
suddenly rises, and the probability of White approaches rapidly 20%. Once balls of both
colors are observed, if the relative frequency of observed White goes under 20% the effect
of ‘attraction’ gets more enhanced, because the next possibility, related to box B2, is too
far.13
Also interesting is run 3 (Fig. 5), characterized by 16 black in a row.14 As a result, for
a while we believed stronger and stronger we had picked up B0, and thus the probability of
White in the next extraction was (exponentially) decreasing. resulting in small probability
of White in the next extraction. Than, suddenly, we observe White, and the probability of
B0 instantly drops to zero,
15 while the probability B1 jumps practically at 100% and that
of a next White at 20%.16 It is nice, and instructive, to observe that from this extraction
on, P (W | seq, I) will always be slightly above 20%. Those who have a biased mind would
speak about a ‘biased estimator’. In reality, it is a just logical consequence of the fact
that, once we have ruled out B0, the probability of White in a future extraction, weighted
average of all possible values of the propensity of the box to give White, has to be slightly
above the minimum possible value of propensity, that is 1/5. The frequency based value,
as well as that from the misused Laplace rule, remains quite for a while below 20%, and
than oscillates around it, in contradiction with the fact that B0 has been definitively ruled
out.
You might object that after a very long sequence also the other evaluations will even-
tually ’converge’ (see Footnote 28 of Ref. [2] for remarks on the precise meaning of this
term in probability theory), but, as it as been famously said, “in the long run we are all
13No esoteric meaning is attached to the term ‘attraction’. It is just because the next possible value of
propensity, 4/5 of box B2, is “too far” – see Appendix B.
14But if you check the file you will see that there were already 11 Black just before, summing thus to
27 Black in a run (and, after 2 White, other 6 Black follow). It simply happened, and for this reason I
would like to insist on the worries already expressed in Footnote 28 of Ref. [2], i.e. interpreting probabilistic
statements as pedantic regularities.
15I am sorry for those who dislike discontinuities, but a crucial single (solid) experimental information
can change dramatically our vision of the world, as it happens to those who suddenly learn that their quite
and polite neighbor was indeed a serial killer keeping rests of human bodies in his fridge.
16More precisely,
> N=5; i=0:N; pii=i/N; n=17; x=1
> ( PBi = pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) / sum( pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) ) )
[1] 0.000000e+00 9.803047e-01 1.965040e-02 4.487479e-05 9.129799e-10
> sum( pii * PBi )
[1] 0.203948
9
dead.”17 Let us see what happens if we analyze the full sequence of 1000 extractions (Fig.
6). The frequency based evaluations of the next observation is still oscillating around 20%,
while that obtained from probability theory approaches 1/5 (from above!) by 10≈−40 [rough
estimate obtained extrapolating the probability of P (B2 | seq) from the above plot].
5 Box B2
Let us conclude this round up by also showing the results of the analysis of three runs
and of the complete sequence from the box B2 (Figures 7, 8, 9 and 7) without further
comments, besides that in probabilistic matter, as in real life, the German dictum “einmal
ist keinmal” applies.
6 P (Bi | seq, I): Bayesian vs frequentistic evaluations
After having seen the comparisons of the evaluations of probabilities of White in a future
extraction, someone would like to see something similar concerning the probability of the
different box compositions in the light of the observed sequence. But he/she will be disap-
pointed to learn that such a comparison is simply impossible because frequentists prohibit
the very concept of P (Bi | seq, I). That’s all, Sorry! (And I am sorry for you, if you thought
you were a frequentist, but, nevertheless, you also thought that such a probability had a
meaning – see [5, 6] and references therein for details).
7 Most of our observations had very small chance to occur
An important misconception about probability is to confuse the probability of the effect
given a given hypothesis with the probability of that hypothesis given the observed effect.
The name “prosecutor fallacy”, with which this logical error is often designed gives, by
itself, an idea of its relevant importance in real life.18 Continuing with the style of this
paper, I would like to touch this point using the third run of the sequence from box B1
(Fig. 5), which I find particular instructive. We shall analyze what we have learned after
the 16th, the 17th and the 100th extraction, also giving the details of the calculations in
R, which start with the usual initialization (N=5; i=0:N; pii=i/N):
17https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/John_Maynard_Keynes#Quotes
18See e.g. http://www.agenarisk.com/resources/probability_puzzles/prosecutor.shtml. This fal-
lacy is somehow similar to the misinterpretation of ‘p-values’ as probability of hypotheses (see [5, 6] and
references therein), but, even if the numbers are less impressive, the logical fallacy of misinterpreting p-
values is even worst, because the erroneous conclusion is not based solely on the data, but also on data less
probable than those actually observed.
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Figure 6: Simulated extractions from B1 (full sequence 1:1000).
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Figure 7: Simulated extractions from B2 (run 1: 1:100).
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Figure 8: Simulated extractions from B1 (run 2: 101:200).
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Figure 9: Simulated extractions from B2 (run 3: 201:300).
14
22222
2
222
22
222
222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
0 200 400 600 800 1000
1e
−2
0
1e
−1
5
1e
−1
0
1e
−0
5
1e
+0
0
e
P(
Bi 
| s
eq
)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1111
11
11
111
111111111111
11111111111
111111
1111
1111
1
11111
1111111
1111111111111111
111
1
111
1111111111111
11111111111
11111111111111111111
111
111
111111111
11111111
1111
111111
111111111111111111111
111111
111111111
1
111111
111111
11111
11111111111
1111111111
111
111111
111
11111111111111
11111
1111
1111
11111
1111111111
111111111
11111111111111111
1111111111
1
1111
111
11
111111111
11
111111
11
1111111111111
1
11111111
111
11
111111111111111
11111111111111111
111111111
1
11111
111111
111
1
111111
111111
1
111
111111111111111111111111
111111
1
11111111
1111111
111111111111111
11
111111111
11111
111
1
1111
111
111111
1111111111111
111
1
111
111111
111111
111
1
111
1111
111
111
11
11111111111111
111
11111111111
111111
1111111111
1111
111111111
33333
3333333333333
3333
333333333
3333
33333333333333333
33
3333333
33333333333333
3333333333
333333
333
33333
3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
333333333333333
333333
333
333333
33333333333333
333333333333333333333333333
333333333333
3333
3333333333333333333
3333
33333333333333333333
3333333333333333333
3333333333
3333
33333333333
33333
3333333333
333333333
3333333333
3333333333333
333333333333
333
33333
3333333
33333333333
3333333333333
333333
333333333333333333333333333
333333333333333
333333333333333
333333333
333333333333333333333333333333333333
33333333333333333
3333333333333333333333333333333
333333333333333
33333
333333333333333
3333333333333333
33333333333333333333333333333333333333
333333
44
4444444
4
4
4
4
4
4
444
4
4
44
4
4
4
44
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
44
4
4444
444
4
4
444
444
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
44
44
4
4
4
4
4
444
44
44
4
4
4
444
4
44
4
4
44444
44
44
4
44
4
4
4
4
4
4
44
444
4
4
44
4
44
4444
444
4
4
44
44
4
44
4
444
4
44444
444
4444
4
4
44444
4444
4
444
44
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
444
44
4
4444444
4
444
44
44
4
4
444
4
4
4
444
4
4
4
444
4
44
444
4
444
44
4444
44
4
4
444
44
4444
44444
4
444
44444
4
4
4
44
444
44444
4
44
4
444
444
4
4
4
4
44
4
4
4
444
4444
555
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
llllllllll
l
l
l
ll
llllll
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
e
P(
W
 | s
eq
)  [
or 
 'ru
le
s']
l Bayes
Frequency
"Laplace"
Figure 10: Simulated extractions from B2 (full sequence 1:1000).
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n = 16 (run 3): At the beginning we had 16 black in a row, resulting on the following
probabilities:
> n=16; x=0; ( PBi = pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) / sum( pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) ) )
[1] 9.723559e-01 2.736939e-02 2.743123e-04 4.176237e-07 6.372432e-12
> sum( pii * PBi )
[1] 0.005583852
We are 97% confident to have got B0, 2.7% to have got B1, and so on. On the other
hand, the probabilities to get “0 white in 16 trials” – be careful, I am trying to fool
you – under the different hypotheses Bi are ((5− i)/5)16, that is
> ((5-i)/5)^16
[1] 1.000000e+00 2.814750e-02 2.821110e-04 4.294967e-07 6.553600e-12 0.000000e+00
So it seems than that the small probability to B1 is due to the small probability to
get the ‘observation’ (x = 0, n = 16) from B1; and similarly with the other boxes
which contain white balls.
n = 17 (run 3): Here is what happened after the next extraction, in which we observe
White:
> n=17; x=1; ( PBi = pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) / sum( pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) ) )
[1] 0.000000e+00 9.803047e-01 1.965040e-02 4.487479e-05 9.129799e-10 0.000000e+00
> sum( pii * PBi )
[1] 0.203948
What is, instead, the probability of the observation, subject to the different compo-
sitions? You might think at binomial distributions resulting in 1 success in 17 trials,
with probabilities given by i/5, that is
> dbinom(x, n, pii)
[1] 0.000000e+00 9.570149e-02 1.918355e-03 4.380867e-06 8.912896e-11 0.000000e+00
However, this is not we have really observed, but just its summary. The observation
was indeed the sequence! And the probability of the sequence is quite different:19
> pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x)
[1] 0.000000e+00 5.629500e-03 1.128444e-04 2.576980e-07 5.242880e-12 0.000000e+00
n = 100 (run 3): As it easy to predict, the difference becomes ‘dramatic’ for very large
values of n. Having observed 18 White in 100 extractions, these are the probabilities
of the hypotheses:
> n=100; x=18; ( PBi = pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) / sum( pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x) ) )
[1] 0.000000e+00 9.999851e-01 1.491273e-05 8.011548e-17 2.938692e-39 0.000000e+00
to be compared with the probability of 18 successes in 100 trials for the different boxes:
> dbinom(x, n, pii)
[1] 0.000000e+00 9.089812e-02 1.355559e-06 7.282455e-18 2.671256e-40
But the conditional probabilities of what we have really observed are now strikingly
different:
19The difference is due to the binomial coefficient, equal to 17 in this case, for which we have to divide
the previous numbers.
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> pii^x * (1-pii)^(n-x)
[1] 0.000000e+00 2.964277e-21 4.420612e-26 2.374881e-37 8.711229e-60 0.000000e+00
But indeed, the fact that this sequence had 3 × 10−21 chance (really in the sense of
a propensity) to occur from B1 is absolutely irrelevant. What matters is only this
probability with respect to those from the other boxes. Indeed the respective con-
ditional probabilities provide the Bayes-Turing factors for every pair of hypotheses.
And therefore, since in our toy experiment the different compositions were initially
equally likely, we get odds of B1 vs B2 of 6.7 × 104; vs B3 and B4 1.2 × 1016 and
3.4× 1038, respectively. These are the numbers that matter.
At this point I hope the lesson is clear, without you need to be further impressed with the
numbers that we would get analyzing the full sequence of 1000 extractions:
• that fact that we can make our inference and prediction based on the number of trials
and the number of successes it is because these summaries are ‘sufficient’ for the
purpose of the inference (and forecasting); but the real observation is the sequence;
• most of the fact of real life had very little chance to occur, if we analyze them
with enough accuracy. But this implies little on the probabilities of the cause that
might have produced them. What matters are the ratio of conditional probabilities:
P (E |Ci, I)/P (E |Cj , I).
8 Conclusions
Having to evaluate probabilities of hypotheses and probabilities of occurrences of future
events, unless you possess a crystal ball, it is hard to out-perform Bayesian reasoning, if
it is used consistently, and all the available pieces of information are properly taken into
account. But the lesson which comes from playing with the simulated sequences goes beyond
the demonstration of the power of the so called Bayesian methods.
For example I find it important that, in the training of probabilistic thinking, people
should be exposed to the rich variety of what can occur randomly. And, therefore, most
events of real life had very little chance to occur. Think, for example, at a given configuration
of light content in pixels, when you shoot a picture with a digital camera. More simply,
and easier to calculate, consider a number to twelve decimal places that can come from a
Gaussian random number generator, like that obtained with the following R commands:
> options(digits=14); set.seed(20160715); nd=12; dxm=10^(-nd)/2
> (xr=round(rnorm(1), nd)); as.double(sprintf("%.2e", dnorm(xr,) * 2 * dxm))
[1] 1.479427401471
[1] 1.34e-13
> (xr=round(rnorm(1), nd)); as.double(sprintf("%.2e", dnorm(xr,) * 2 * dxm))
[1] -0.762658301757
[1] 2.98e-13
(Yes, every time you repeat this line of code you will observe, with certainty, numbers
17
which had about 1-in-trillions chance to occur! And they all come with probability 1 from
a Gaussian random generator with µ = 0 and and σ = 1)
The reason I insist on these apparently trivial considerations is that I have seen too
often in the past, and even quite recently, attempts of indoctrinating people with ‘statistical
regularities’. These attempts imply a misinterpretation of probability theorems and, at the
same time, a refusal of the concept of a single event probability. Instead, not only degrees of
beliefs apply to single events, but also propensities, if we reflect on the fact that a propensity
might change with time [2].
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